Abstract: Stalls in fertility declines have been reported for countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Recent interest has focused mostly on Sub-Saharan Africa. This papers reviews past studies of fertility stalls and considers the implications of alternative methods of defining and measuring the phenomenon. It offers some reflections on the theoretical and policy significance of various attempts to identify and explain stalls.
Introduction
In 1985 the World Bank published a report on stalling fertility declines in South Korea, Sri Lanka and Costa Rica (Gendell, 1985) . Like many other countries in Latin America, East Asia, and South Asia, they had experienced a period of sustained, and fairly rapid, decline in fertility rates. What made them stand out was that the downward trend had come to a stop. The report does not explain in any detail the reasons for the World Bank's interest in countries where downward trends in fertility had stalled, no doubt because they seemed at the time selfevident, especially in view of the Bank's broad aims. Continuing high rates of population growth were a matter for concern in countries that were still very poor by Western standards. It was hoped and expected that fertility rates in the developing world would eventually decline to somewhere near replacement level. There was (and still is) a wide consensus that this demographic transition would facilitate economic development and improve individual well-being. If it was true, therefore, that in some countries the downward trend in fertility was levelling off with rates still well above replacement level, this would not only challenge theoretical expectations, it also would have important policy implications. The World Bank's interest centred, firstly, on a question of fact -was it really the case that the declines in fertility rates had ground to a halt in some countries? -and, secondly, on the problem of explanation -why was this happening? Without a good understanding of causal mechanisms, any attempt to develop policies that might help restart the transition to lower fertility would be like shooting in the dark.
Although theoretical questions are not considered in the World Bank paper, a central idea does nonetheless frame the questions that it asks. It was expected not only that the observed decline in infant and child mortality in developing countries would be followed by a decline in fertility, but also that fertility rates would continue to fall to a point where they were more or less in equilibrium with the new low mortality regime. Although the process of fertility decline is conceptualised in a way that can readily accommodate different rates of decline, an interruption in the downward trend of fertility unsettles the conviction that, once started, fertility decline will continue until rates reach a level that suffices for a new equilibrium (i.e. low or zero population growth). Since fertility stalls have the effect of postponing the achievement of a level of fertility that is expected as well as desired, unless there are solid theoretical reasons for thinking that they are likely to last only a few years rather than decades, their occurrence is at the very least disconcerting, and arguably highlights the importance of improving demographic understanding of the forces that promote or impede fertility decline. The force of this conclusion is not much impaired, even if we accept, as the UN pointed out in a commentary on its 2006 population projections, that 'they seldom last more than a quinquennium'. This is, after all, only an empirical generalization1.
The focus shifts to Sub-Saharan Africa
Between 1985, when the World Bank published its report on fertility stalls that had occurred in the 1970s, and the turn of the century, very few researchers or policy analysts turned their attention to the topic, and not for another 20 years was there to be an attempt at a comprehensive survey. Published studies in this period concentrated instead on single-country analyses (Knodel, 1988 on Thailand; Aghajanian, 1991 on Iran; De Silva, 1994 on Sri Lanka; Holl et al., 1993 on Costa Rica).
Then, after the turn of the century, interest in the issue was re-ignited by a series of UN reports. The first of these, published in 2002, was a general review of fertility trends in the developing world that highlighted the stalling of fertility declines in Bangladesh and Egypt in the late 1990s. The second, published in 2005, picked up where the World Bank had left off, and incorporated a comprehensive review of fertility trends in countries where the Demographic and Health Surveys provided sufficient data (i) to identify cases of stalling, and (ii) to explore trends in the proximate determinants of fertility in cases where stalling had occurred (Bongaarts, 2005) . The 2005 report identifies a handful of cases of temporary stalling from the 1990s (i.e. no longer stalling in the most recent data, but subsequent to the period covered by World Bank analysis) and several cases of countries where the fertility decline was currently stalling (i.e. according to the most recent data). The earlier stalls were mostly in Latin America, the exception being Turkey. Only two of the seven countries identified as currently stalling were from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Table 1 lists countries outside SSA that have experienced stalls since the 1985 Gendell report.
Bongaarts' 2005 report has been followed by several global or regional surveys of fertility stalling 1 It also overlooks the long-lasting stall in Argentina, which Pantelides (1996) reckons to have a lasted for about 30 years.
in the developing world. Like Bongaarts, these papers restrict their interest to countries which have conducted at least two Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). With that proviso, however, they do try to be comprehensive. In a couple of cases, the surveys include all regions with DHS data (Bongaarts, 2008; Shapiro et al., 2010) . The others focus exclusively on Sub-Saharan Africa (Shapiro & Gebreselassie, 2008; Garenne, 2008; Schoumaker, 2009; Sneeringer, 2009; Machiyama et al., 2010) . See Table 2 .
The key paper in this series of studies is a second review by Bongaarts (2008) . The emphasis shifts from the question of causation in the earlier 2005 report to the elaboration of a systematic approach to case identification. In this later survey of stalling fertility declines, Sub-Saharan Africa, or more exactly that region of Sub-Saharan Africa that lies north of Botswana and Namibia, stands out from the rest of the developing world. This has more to do with the availability of data that brings more Sub-Saharan countries into focus than with changes in trends. Bongaarts' main conclusion is that the average pace of fertility decline slowed significantly in Sub-Saharan African countries between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s. As many as two-thirds of the countries in the region experienced no significant decline between the two most recent surveys, and more than half of the countries in mid-transition (see below) were in a stall. Outside Sub-Saharan Africa, stalling is now rare, with only one Asian/North African country and one Latin American country identified as stalling. In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, fertility stalling seems to be far from exceptional, and in those countries where fertility is declining, the rate of decline is in most cases relatively slow (i.e. compared to earlier fertility declines in Asia and Latin America as well as earlier rates of decline in these countries themselves). In the Southern African countries, on the other hand, fertility has fallen below three children per woman2.
The policy concern that motivated the World Bank study in 1985 is clearly present in Bongaarts' commentary on Sub-Saharan Africa. When high fertility is combined with relatively low mortality, it leads to rapid population growth and high rates of child dependency. Stalls and slowdowns in the fertility transition delay the prospect of a demographic dividend from declining dependency rates (Eastwood & Lipton, 2011) , and there are plenty of powerful reasons for thinking that continuing high fertility undermines the prospects for economic and social development, and makes it more difficult for households to escape from poverty3. There is, however, an important additional dimension to the concern about SubSaharan Africa, which is that stalling fertility -when it is such a common occurrence across the region -may be symptomatic of the extent to which high fertility is embedded in Sub-Saharan African societies4. It lends support to the view that the transition to a low 3 A large increase in the numbers of children puts a massive strain on countries that already struggle to provide enough schooling for their populations. Cities that are already bursting at the seams threaten to grow into increasingly unmanageable megacities, which makes it harder and harder for them to keep up with the demand for infrastructure and productive employment, and this in turn impairs their potential to act as engines of economic growth. 4 See, for example, leading article 'Fertility treatment' in The Economist, 8 March 2014. mortality, low fertility demographic regime may prove much harder to achieve in Sub-Saharan Africa than it has elsewhere. The updated list of Sub-Saharan African countries with currently stalling fertility in Table 3 also supports this view. Out of the 27 countries in the region which have 'reasonably current' data, 14 have 'stagnant'5 fertility.
Definitions and methods
The various analyses and surveys of fertility stalling that have been published since Bongaarts' 2005 report for the UN Population Council do not agree, however, on which countries are experiencing fertility stalls. There are several radically different estimates of the number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where fertility is stalling. Schoumaker (2009 ), Machiyama (2010 and Garenne (2008) all come up with much 5 This includes countries with pre-transitional fertility as well as stalling fertility (see below). lower figures than Bongaarts (2008) , and they do so on the basis of different definitions and methods6. Bongaarts' view, seconded by the analyses of Shapiro and colleagues, that fertility stalling is common in Sub-Saharan Africa, is not universally shared. Some of the discrepancies in case identification are trivial: studies use data from the most recent DHS to determine whether fertility is currently stalling in a given country, and new data may lead to revision of the assessment (i.e. no longer stalling; now stalling)7. There are also, however, significant discrepancies which arise from (i) the use of different criteria to identify cases of fertility stalling, and (ii) a different, and arguably more rigorous, approach to the measurement of fertility.
As far as the broad outline of the notion of fertility stalling is concerned, there is general agreement.
6 All three studies were undertaken with a view to testing Bongaarts' conclusion. 7 For example, Bangladesh is included in the list of countries currently stalling in Bongaarts (2005) , but not in the updated list from Bongaarts (2008) .
• Fertility decline can only stall in a country where the fertility transition has already started. Countries which are pre-transitional are not counted as cases of stalling. • Since only those countries which are in midtransition can experience a stall, fertility should have fallen 'quite a bit' or 'some way' before stalling.
• Countries where fertility is already close to replacement level are also excluded from consideration. Just as it is important to distinguish countries at an early stage of transition from pre-transitional countries, so it is important to distinguish countries which are at a late stage of transition from post-transitional countries.
When it comes to operationalising these ideas, however, there are two important areas of difference: (i) how they draw the line between pre-transitional and transitional (i.e. in mid-transition); (ii) how they draw the line between a stall and a change in the rate of decline that falls short of a stall. Machiyama (2010) , on the other hand, classifies high fertility countries as pretransitional unless there has been a decline of at least 20% from the highest observed fertility. The sensitivity of these categories to the setting of boundaries can be further illustrated with the updated TFR estimates used in Table 3 . The choice of a different boundary between transitional and pre-transitional fertility (e.g. TFR > 5 rather than 6) would shift three countries from one category (declining fertility) to another (pretransitional), and so increase the number of countries with 'stagnant' fertility. The change in the rate of fertility decline that constitutes a stall also varies across different studies. The earliest definition -Gendell's -stipulates that the decline should be followed by a stop or a substantial deceleration (operationalised as at least a halving of the rate in the preceding period for five or four years at a minimum), and this is followed by Machiyama. Bongaarts (2008) stipulates that a fertility decline is stalling unless there has been a significant decline in fertility in the most recent inter-survey period, i.e. a decline that is significantly different (p<0.05) from zero. Shapiro, in both his papers, states simply that a stall occurs if TFR fails to decline across two measurements. Finally, there is a definition used by both Moultrie et al. (2008) and Garenne (2008) , which requires three measurements (i.e. three waves of DHS data) to establish the presence of fertility decline and uses linear regression to test for a significant change (p< 0.05 level) in the slope of the line connecting the observations: a stall is a period during which the slope changes from negative (fertility decline) to nil or positive9. Once again, the implications of these differences can be illustrated by comparing Bongaarts (2008) with Shapiro et al. (2010) . Bongaarts' requirement for a decline significantly different from zero has the effect of capturing more countries in the net than the criterion used by Shapiro et al. Hence, whereas Bongaarts counts Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Guatemala as cases of fertility stalling (because the decline is not significantly different from zero), Shapiro et al. consider all of these countries except Nigeria and Zambia to have declining fertility. Garenne's criterion for stalling is even more 'strict', and Nigeria is the only one of this group of countries that counts as a case of stalling fertility. The updated list of countries with currently stalling fertility in Table 3 applies the criteria of Bongaarts and Shapiro et al. Not all the discrepancies in the identification of cases of fertility stalling arise from differences in criteria. There is also an issue about measurement. Schoumaker (2009) asks whether the cases of fertility stalling that have been identified by Bongaarts in SSA are genuine or spurious, and what he has in mind here is the robustness of the estimates of period fertility that are used in the DHS to classify a country's fertility trend as stalling or not. Schoumaker uses individual birth histories from the DHS to construct retrospective estimates of TFRs for the 15 years before the survey, and these are compared with published values for TFRs. He concludes that some of the SSA estimates suffer from serious data quality problems, leading to underestimation of recent fertility in many surveys. In some cases, underestimation of fertility was larger in the next to last survey than in the last survey, creating the appearance of a stall in fertility. In other cases, a considerable degree of underestimation was repeated in several surveys, and these were re-classified as pre-transitional. As a result, he eventually shrinks Bongaarts' list of nine countries to just one, Kenya. The re-measurement of fertility stalling in SSA is repeated by Machiyama (2010) , who adjusts period fertility estimates in line with assessments of the impact of misreporting of (i) age at birth, and (ii) date of births. Machiyama agrees with Schoumaker that the evidence for stalling is compelling only in Kenya10, though he identifies 'possible stalls' in Benin, Rwanda and Zambia. A similar level of methodological rigour -with the same approach to measurement -can be found in a recent examination of possible fertility stalling in Jordan (Cetorelli & Leone, 2012) .
Sneeringer (2009) makes a somewhat different use of the individual birth histories provided by the DHS. Instead of constructing retrospective estimates of period TFRs with these data, she uses them to estimate cohort fertility trends for 30 countries in SSA. The data enable her (i) to construct a panel of women born between 1937 and 1990, and (ii) to analyse their fertility behaviour between 1952 and 2005. The study does indeed find evidence of stalling, but it occurs across all age groups only in Congo (Brazzaville) and Madagascar, and concludes that there is not "unequivocal evidence of a reversal in Africa's fertility transition" (p.15).
A further elaboration of methodologies for identifying fertility stalls is given by Grace and Sweeny (2010) in their analysis of what they call Guatemala's 'potential' stall in fertility decline. After considering the advantages and disadvantages of different measures of fertility (tempo-adjusted period TFR; parity progression ratios; cohort measures) at national and sub-national level, they argue that tempo-adjusted period measures and regional disaggregation offer the best insights into change. Certainly their decision to look at regional differences is in line with several of the analyses of stalling in Sub-Saharan Africa Westoff & Cross, 2006) and elsewhere (Ishida et al., 2009 ).
Causation and explanation
The essential starting point for the analysis of trends in virtually all published studies of fertility stalling is Bongaarts' model of the proximate determinants of fertility. This was first published in the 1970s and was used by Gendell in the 1985 World Bank report. The basic idea is that the analysis of trends in total fertility is a two-step procedure: first, identify the effects of observed changes in the proximate determinants of fertility on TFR; second, look for underlying societal factors that can explain the changes in the proximate determinants. Many of the studies cited here do not go much beyond the first step, usually because they see themselves as venturing onto much weaker ground when it comes to identifying the ultimate or underlying determinants of fertility stalling. Where conclusions are advanced about the ultimate determinants of these stalls, they are tentative and hedged round with qualifications. Some authors, like Cetorelli and Leone (2012) in their analysis of stalling in Jordan, conclude simply by highlighting the need for 'further investigations' to shed light on the factors that explain what is happening with the proximate determinants of fertility.
As for the proximate determinants themselves, they are a set of factors that have the effect of reducing a woman's fertility from a level set by natural potential, e.g. the likelihood of being in a 'union'; postpartum infecundability; the prevalence of pathological sterility; and the use of contraception. These factors can be seen to vary from society to society, and they change over time. To take one obvious example, in countries where childbearing happens almost exclusively within marriage (as in Sri Lanka and South Korea in the 1970s), a change in the age at first marriage has an impact on the likelihood that a woman of childbearing age is in a 'union' -which has the effect of reducing 'exposure to risk' of childbearing in the female population of childbearing age. In these same societies, changes in customs regulating the duration of breastfeeding or postpartum abstinence from sexual intercourse will have an impact on the likelihood of conception within marriage.
As Bongaarts (1984) notes, we can divide the proximate determinants of fertility into two general classes -those that can be expected in future to exert upward pressure on fertility, such as a shortening of the period of breastfeeding and a decline in pathological sterility, and those that can be expected to reduce fertility, such as a rise in the age at first marriage and higher prevalence and effectiveness of contraception. What Bongaarts has in mind here are general social trends, and as he points out, the fertility-reducing effect of a rise in the age of marriage may be cancelled out by a shortening of the period of breastfeeding, and these twin changes in proximate determinants may themselves be linked to the same underlying social trend (e.g. more formal employment opportunities for women).
As for conclusions, the studies that have been cited here can be divided into two categories. There are those, like Gendell's, that limit themselves to the single case or cases under consideration (why did fertility decline stall here?) and there are those that look for common factors across several cases (why do fertility declines stall?). Here, for example, is how Westoff & Cross (2006) answer the first question in the case of Kenya; they do it by looking closely at regional and educational differences in fertility and contraception.
"The decline of fertility has stalled because of the plateau in contraceptive prevalence and, perhaps more fundamentally, a shift toward wanting more children. We have been able to identify the segments of the population where stalls or reversals have occurred and some of the mechanisms. These changes in reproductive preferences have been pervasive; women with no education and Muslim women show dramatic reversals while women with at least some secondary education have continued to want and have fewer births." (p.38) "Although the analysis has identified the demographic dynamics of the stall in the fertility transition in Kenya, a full explanation is lacking. Shortages of contraceptive supplies have probably played some role but this does not explain the increase in the proportion of women who want more children." (p.ix)
What is true for Kenya may not be true elsewhere however, and the central importance of contraceptive prevalence as a proximate cause is not confirmed by all the individual country case studies. Single case studies may in this way provide counterexamples, or at least potential counter-examples, to established generalizations. In Ecuador, for example, contraceptive prevalence increased from 57% to 73% between 1994 and 2004 (Ishida et al., 2009 ) and according to Bongaarts' model of proximate cases, this should have translated into a reduction of one lifetime birth per woman. What in fact happened is that total fertility remained more or less stable over the same period. A similar phenomenon (increasing contraception plus stagnant fertility) was noted for Bangladesh in the late 1990s (Islam et al., 2004) .
Like Ishida et al., Eltigani (2003) takes a case study -the fertility stall in Egypt -as an opportunity to test a generalization. He is interested in the association between fertility decline and socioeconomic development, and in particular wants to test the suggestion that, in countries with intermediate fertility, the decline in national TFR will slow down or stall unless there is improvement in socioeconomic conditions for people at the lowest socioeconomic level. What he finds is that women from middle and high socio-economic groups acted as a kind of vanguard for the country as a whole. They led the fertility decline, and the fact that the trend toward lower family size simply stopped in this group with fertility around three births per woman can explain most of the stall in the fertility decline of TFR. Once the gap in age at marriage and in the uptake of contraception between these women and those from lower socioeconomic groups has narrowed (i.e. the trend towards fertility convergence between the different groups continues), it is hard to see how fertility can continue to fall to replacement levels without a significant change in the desired number of children among all social groups, i.e. a general cultural change. In other words, and this is Eltigani's conclusion, improvement in socioeconomic conditions for people at the lowest socioeconomic level is not the key to continuing fertility decline.
When it comes to looking beyond single countries to identify common factors in groups of countries, it is important not to forget that some of this research, in particular some of the studies looking at SubSaharan Africa, rejects most of the supposed cases of stalling as spurious, and hence sees no reason to look for the causes of fertility stalling across the region. For both Schoumaker and Machiyama, therefore, it is a question of explaining one or two isolated cases, which is not how the problem presents itself to other commentators such as Bongaarts, Shapiro or Garenne. For these others, what we see are apparently divergent findings that can be explained, at least in part, by differences in the selection of cases.
Bongaarts' 2005 paper11 on the causes of stalling fertility transitions includes in its analysis only two African countries (Ghana and Kenya) out of a total of seven cases of stalling. His main conclusion is that fertility-reducing trends in key proximate determinants -modern contraceptive use; demand for contraception; ideal family size -showed signs of levelling off (they 'plateau'). There was, however, no major deterioration in contraceptive access (though in all cases levels of unmet need for contraception and unwanted fertility remain high). Nor was there any link between the presence of a stall and trends in socioeconomic development (measured by GDP per capita and girls' schooling). Bongaarts' later paper (2008) takes a somewhat different view, even though it is not intended or presented as an investigation of the reasons for stalling. The very marked change of pace in fertility decline across Sub-Saharan Africa looks like a regional trend, and the cases of fertility stalling are part of this. It is plausible, Bongaarts now suggests, to look for explanations of this trend in three factors: firstly, the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on mortality; secondly, poorly performing economies; and thirdly the lower priority assigned to family planning programs (Cleland et al., 2006) . Shapiro and Gebreselassie (2008) consider a different set of cases from Bongaarts, and find different associations. Moreover, they are only interested in cases of fertility stalling within Sub-Saharan Africa (n=7)12. As with Bongaarts, they look at causation through the lens of the proximate determinants, and look for the factors that are associated with faster or slower rates of decline (with stalls showing 'negative declines' in fertility). The national-level regression analysis picks out three dominant factors that account for 60% of the variation in declines in TFR: education (faster growth in girls' education associated with lower fertility); infant and child mortality (faster reduction in mortality is associated with lower fertility); and GDP per capita (more GDP growth is associated with slower declines in fertility). Unlike Bongaarts, they find no evidence of a significant relationship between changes in fertility and changes in contraceptive use or ideal fertility. Garenne (2008) looks at a smaller set of cases than Shapiro, and compares them with five 'control' countries -Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Senegal -rather than 'all the others'13. He is also at pains to distinguish between the six cases rather than assimilate them to a single pattern. Thus, for example, in Tanzania and Ghana, stalling occurred despite an increase in contraceptive use, whereas in Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda, the stall was associated with a decline or no improvement in contraceptive use. As he says, "no pattern seems to emerge from the proximate determinants, and the situations of the six countries appear as diverse". The same diversity is apparent in the tentative analysis of the ultimate determinants of stalling, which is not 12 24 SSA countries with the relevant DHA data are included in the analysis. Southern African countries are not in the pool. 13 In addition to three countries identified as cases -Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria -Garenne looks at three sub-national cases identified through rural/urban analyses: urban Madagascar, rural Rwanda and rural Tanzania. to say, however, that the occurrence of stalling in the individual countries is not understandable, and for each case -with one exception -Garenne makes a plausible link between trends in (i) contraceptive use, and/or (ii) age at marriage, on the one hand, and particular configurations of socio-economic factors on the other. The exception is Ghana, where Garenne professes himself to be at a loss for a plausible explanation. Ezeh et al. (2009) , like both Shapiro and Garenne, focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, but the group of countries that are selected for analysis is different again14. They are all from East Africa, and all have four rounds of DHS data. Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda are identified as cases of stalling. In Zimbabwe, the last member of the group, fertility decline was constant across the four surveys -though weak enough across one inter-survey period to be classified as a stall by Bongaarts (and is stalling across the two most recent surveys -see Table 3 ). For these countries, the findings that stand out are: firstly, the trends in contraceptive prevalence (they plateau or go into reverse); secondly, an apparent increase in the desire for large families; and finally, the strong association between fertility decline and access to female education.
Conclusion
The idea of a fertility stall is, on the face of it, straightforward. It tries to capture a certain kind of change in the rate of progress from one state (pretransitional fertility) to another (replacement level fertility). A stall is a limiting case of a slowdown in the rate of decline and once the criteria have been fixed, we can place fertility trajectories into a small number of categories: pre-transitional, 'making progress' (i.e. declining), stalling, and post-transitional15.
It has been suggested that the original rationale for distinguishing between declining and stalling was practical; the transition from declining to stalling could act as a signal for policymakers to intervene, i.e.
14 Ezeh et al. also use a somewhat different framework for the analysis, with three levels: reproductive health (broadly similar to the proximate determinants); institutional factors (essentially the effort put into family planning services); and socio-economic factors. The same model underpins the analysis in a Population Council report on Kenya (Askew et al., 2009) . 15 Note that the terminology would seem to imply that only certain moves between these states are 'allowed'. Countries 'can' make progress and then stall; they 'cannot' make progress and then return to a pre-transitional state. do something new or intensify existing efforts so as to restart fertility decline. What should be done to restart fertility decline when it had (apparently) stopped? The practical question requires, as the early World Bank report insisted, an understanding of the reasons for the stall, and this in turn requires an operational definition that determines what constitutes relevant data for the purposes of analysis.
Looked at from this point of view, we might reasonably wonder, however, whether policymakers should attach much weight to the distinction between a significant slowdown in the pace of decline (Gendell's definition) or a decline that is not significantly different from zero (Bongaart's definition), on the one hand, and a complete stop, on the other (the definition used by Moultrie and Shapiro) . Part of the problem here is that analysts, in the context of most of Sub-Saharan Africa, are looking at changes in rates of change which are themselves slow. Case identification can be a matter of distinguishing countries in which there is no significant movement in fertility (stalling or apparent stalling) from countries in which there is very little movement. Refinements in measurement and in statistical analysis can help with this, and several of the papers mentioned in this essay have done exactly that. Even so, bearing in mind the practical purpose of the exercise, it is hard to see why policymakers would want to insist (a) that a very small decline is still a decline, and not a stall 'in the strict sense', and (b) that the trigger for policy intervention should be a stall -and nothing short of a stall. Consider a country that has a TFR of 5.5, and then fertility falls by about 0.02 children per woman per year for two decades. At that rate it would take 50 years to attain a TFR of 4.5. As well as being a painfully slow 'rate of progress' by Asian or Latin American standards, there are good reasons that arguing that this is too slow provided it is accepted that there are gains from fertility decline. A rate of decline, we might say, is too slow if it postpones the benefits too far into the future, and a sensible (and minimal) criterion for determining whether the benefits lie too far in the future is to ask if living generations would be deprived of them. This is not to say, however, that the occurrence of a stall, even when it is loosely defined in the manner of Bongaarts or Gendell, is the 'right' signal for policy intervention. Why should policymakers not choose as a signal for intervention a rate of decline that would not constitute a stall? In other words, they set themselves a target, and the signal for intervention is the failure (or likely failure over a relevant projection period) to achieve it. As this suggests, however, there is one important political advantage to using a stall as a policy signal, which is that it requires no prior commitment to a fertility target beyond the minimal target of fertility decline within a reasonable planning horizon. What it does not mean is that the decision to use stalling as a signal for intervention is somehow 'policy-neutral', or that a signal other than stalling would be 'arbitrary' in a way that the occurrence of a stall is not. That decision still requires commitment to the view that continuing fertility decline is desirable.
The function of the idea of stalling does seem to be more than merely practical, however, at least to the extent that the occurrence of stalling is used to support empirical claims about fertility trends, in particular the claim that the prevalence of fertility stalling in Sub-Saharan Africa is symptomatic of an attachment to fertility-related norms that distinguishes the region from other parts of the world. For sure, a change in a trajectory of fertility decline for one country -or differences in trajectories across different countriesmay be 'real' phenomena for which we can try to find an explanation. A significant deceleration in the rate of decline or a slowdown to the point of 'no significant progress' are phenomena of interest, for the simple reason that they throw light on the balance of forces that impede or promote fertility decline.
Whatever definition of stalling is settled on, it is clearly important to measure stalling with as much accuracy as possible. It is equally important, however, to be clear about the significance of re-measurements that drastically reduce the number of cases of fertility stalling. It is one thing to be concerned with a certain kind of change in the trajectory decline -and the 'theoretical' problem of explanation that this seems to generate -and quite another to be concerned with the slow pace of fertility decline in Sub-Saharan Africa. The conclusion -based on re-measurementthat there are very few (only one, perhaps) clear and unequivocal cases of stalling in the region has no real bearing on the claim that the pace of decline is too slow (a normative judgement) or indeed on the claim that the relatively slow pace of decline tells us something about the distinctiveness of the fertility transition in the region. At most, what is required by this conclusion is a reformulation of the claim that the high prevalence of fertility stalling in Sub-Saharan Africa is an important part of the evidence for such a view of regional trends. What matters is not stalling of itself, but persistent high levels of fertility and the slow pace of change.
